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Investment Timing Decisions of Managers
under Endogenous Contracts
Abstract
This paper considers what kind of managerial compensation contract is optimal for mit-
igating the moral hazard decision regarding investment timing. We examine the situation
where the personal objectives of managers do not align with those of shareholders and
where there is the possibility of project liquidation but where managerial compensation is
endogenously determined. Using a real options approach, we show that restricted stock is
optimal relative to stock options under various circumstances. However, we also suggest
that stock options are more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock
in firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversified firms involv-
ing more complicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate governance.
In addition, we find that project start-up is more likely to be deterred by the greater
likelihood of project liquidation and larger managerial effort cost, whereas the amount of
stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the probability of liquidation but
is increasing in managerial effort cost.
JEL Classification: D86, G30, G34, M52.




This paper considers the problem of the optimal timing of investment decided by a
manager under uncertainty and the possibility of project liquidation when his objectives
are not aligned with those of shareholders but where his compensation is endogenously
determined. In the literature analyzing investment decisions under uncertainty, the effect
of the irreversibility of investment has been highlighted by McDonald and Siegel (1986)
and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). This irreversibility creates an option value in waiting to
launch a risky but value-increasing investment project and strongly affects the decision
maker’s incentives in undertaking the project.
However, in many modern corporations, the authority to choose when to launch invest-
ment projects is delegated to the manager. If the manager’s objectives are not aligned
with those of shareholders, the option value of waiting to invest for the manager differs
from that for shareholders. Thus, managers are likely to determine the investment (or
disinvestment) timing opportunistically (see Morellec (2004) and Lambrecht and Myers
(2007, 2008)). In fact, managerial compensation also has an impact on option values for
managers waiting to invest. Hence, shareholders should design managerial compensation
schemes that succeed in inducing managers to choose the timing of investments more
appropriately from the shareholders’ point of view.
To capture these perspectives, we develop an agency conflict model with real options
and the possibility of project liquidation, and analyze an optimal incentive contract for
managers in a dynamic setting. The primary purpose of this paper is to examine what
kind of contract is optimal in order to alleviate the manager’s moral hazard incentive
regarding investment timing when his objectives do not align with those of shareholders.
Our basic model builds on an agency setting in which the risk-neutral shareholders of
a firm delegate decisions regarding commencing an investment project to a risk-neutral
manager with limited liability and provide him with incentives to start the project. In
the model, managers are assumed to be more impatient than, or equally as impatient
as, the firm’s initial shareholders and to incur effort costs for investment. As the firm’s
setup costs and the manager’s effort costs for starting the project are sunk, the decision
to launch the investment project is irreversible. Such irreversibility, together with the
uncertain future value of the firm, means that there is an opportunity cost associated
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with investing today. This makes it essential for both the shareholders and the manager
to select, as discussed in the real options literature, the appropriate time for starting the
project.
However, where the manager’s objectives do not align with those of shareholders, the
start-up timing appropriate for the manager differs from that appropriate for shareholders.
Besides, managers’ decisions about whether to expend their effort costs to start the project
are usually unobservable if there is a possibility of project failure; that is, liquidation at
the start of the project. Then, it is impossible to write a complete contract specifying
actions required for an efficient timing decision. However, even in this case, it is possible
to write a contract contingent on the value of the firm’s cash flow stream by using a
stock-based compensation contract. Therefore, we consider how investment timing and
optimal stock-based compensation schemes are endogenously determined together. An
explicit example of our investment problem is that of a corporate manager who chooses
the timing of investment in risky real projects.
Our main findings show that as long as agency conflicts exist:
(i) Restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options in various circumstances. However,
the use of stock options can be more likely instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in
firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers (e.g., reorganized firms with
new debt issues), diversified firms involving more complicated business activities (e.g.,
financial conglomerates), and firms with weaker corporate governance.1
(ii) The optimal trigger for the commencement of the project is increasing in the prob-
ability of liquidation, the volatility of the firm’s cash flows, and the manager’s effort
cost, but decreasing in the degree of managerial impatience. Furthermore, the amount
of stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the probability of liquidation,
increasing in the manager’s effort cost, and decreasing in the volatility of the firm’s cash
flow, and the degree of managerial impatience.
The intuition underlying these results is as follows. First, although the compensation
aspect of stock options gives the manager a strong incentive to launch the project, the
shareholders cannot make the manager fully internalize the benefits of the more efficient
1This conclusion does not necessarily suggest that observed compensation practice, such as stock
options, suffers from any significant defect. Instead, it would be better to state that restricted stock is
optimal if the manager’s investment timing decisions are a major issue, as highlighted by McDonald and
Siegel (1986) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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timing of investment because there is a trade-off between the increasing incentive to
commence the project earlier and the increasing dilution costs relating to the larger grant
size of restricted stock. Hence, the optimal investment trigger from the viewpoint of the
manager is higher than that of the shareholders. However, if the shareholders award stock
options to the manager, the positive exercise price becomes an additional sunk cost to the
manager. This causes further delay in the start-up of the project from the perspective of
the shareholders. Thus, the exercise price needs to be minimized so that the restricted
stock (equivalent to stock options with a zero exercise price) dominates the stock options
with positive exercise prices. Conversely, if we consider the case of new debt financing with
more impatient managers, diversified firms involving more complicated business activities,
or firms with weaker corporate governance, then the optimal investment trigger of the
manager would be lower than that of the shareholders. As a result, in these cases, the
stock options would dominate the restricted stock.
Second, the uncertainty regarding project returns and the irreversibility of investments
creates an incentive to postpone decisions. Thus, an increase in the probability of liqui-
dation at the start of the project raises the risk of losing the sunk cost upon liquidation,
thus delaying the project’s start even further. An increase in the volatility of the firm’s
cash flow and an increase in the manager’s effort cost also raise the value of the man-
ager’s option to wait, thereby motivating the manager to exercise the option to start the
project later. By contrast, when the degree of managerial impatience increases, the value
of the manager’s option to wait decreases. Hence, an increase in the degree of managerial
impatience induces earlier start-up of the project.
Third, as an increase in the liquidation probability at the start of the project merely
raises the risk of losing the sunk cost upon liquidation, the grant size of restricted stock
need not be adjusted so as to internalize this effect. Hence, the grant size of restricted
stock is independent of the possibility of liquidation. Alternatively, the grant size of
restricted stock is increasing in the manager’s effort cost because the manager then needs
to be compensated more. However, the grant size of restricted stock is decreasing in the
volatility of the firm’s cash flow stream and the degree of managerial impatience because
these changes reduce the efficacy of restricted stock in motivating the manager to choose
to launch the project earlier.
This paper continues a long line of research originating in McDonald and Siegel (1986)
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and Dixit and Pindyck (1994) using the real options model to study firms’ investment
decisions. Recently, several studies have explored the agency conflict problem in a real
options model of a firm when there is ownership by outside stockholders but corporate con-
trol by inside managers. For example, Morellec (2004) and Lambrecht and Myers (2008)
discuss the optimal capital structure and investment (or disinvestment) timing problems
under manager—shareholder conflicts. Lambrecht and Myers (2007) also analyze the ef-
fects of golden parachutes (severance agreements) and other takeover mechanisms on the
manager’s disinvestment decision in declining firms. Elsewhere, Hugonnier and Morel-
lec (2007) examine the impact of managerial risk aversion on the manager’s investment
decisions when managers face incomplete markets and are subject to the possibility of a
control challenge. These studies assume that the manager’s compensation is linear in firm
value and the parameter value is fixed exogenously. Thus, shareholders cannot adjust the
linear stock-based compensation scheme endogenously in order to provide incentives for
the manager to choose the more appropriate timing of investment, although the scheme
significantly affects the timing decisions.2
Unlike the real options literature mentioned above, Grenadier and Wang (2005) pro-
vide a model of investment timing under agency conflicts in corporate firms in which the
managerial compensation contract is endogenously determined.3 Their focus, however, is
on how shareholders discipline the patient or impatient manager by offering an incentive
contract contingent on a trigger point. Hence, in contrast to the other literature on real
options under agency conflicts, their model is formulated so that shareholders directly
determine the timing of investment by choosing the trigger point, although the manager
manipulates a hidden level of effort that affects the quality of the project. In this set-
ting, if the manager cannot divert part of the project returns because of the absence of
hidden information, the option to invest in projects of any quality is exercised at the full
information level.
The main difference between our setting and existing real options studies under agency
conflicts is that in our formulation, shareholders can provide incentives for the manager
2Although Lambrecht and Myers (2007) derive the optimal golden parachute (severance agreement),
the other managerial compensation parameters in their model are fixed.
3In terms of other extension studies using the Grenadier and Wang (2005) model, Hori and Osano
(2009) consider the replacement timing of the incumbent manager, while Shibata (2009) incorporates an
audit technology.
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to choose the more appropriate timing of investment by adjusting the managerial com-
pensation contract, even though the manager can still choose his most preferred timing of
investment. Hence, the main contribution of the real options model in our paper is to clar-
ify what kind of managerial contract is optimal in order to mitigate the manager’s moral
hazard decision regarding investment timing. This provides novel empirically testable im-
plications concerning the choice of restricted stock and stock options. In addition, unlike
other real options models, in our model, the sunk cost for the manager regarding the
investment timing decision is summarized as his effort cost. As a result, we can easily
derive the effect of the manager’s sunk cost on investment timing and in doing so examine
the empirically testable implications.
As a result, and unlike Grenadier and Wang (2005), the focus of our paper is on the
situation in which none of the contracts contingent on a trigger point can be upheld,
because the liquidation possibility at the start of the project renders unobservable whether
or not the manager actually expends effort costs to start the project at the trigger point. In
this situation, our focus is how the patient or impatient manager who chooses the timing of
investment can be disciplined by means of a managerial compensation contract. However,
to discipline the manager in this case, shareholders need to design a contract contingent
on the value of the firm’s cash flow stream; that is, a stock-based contract. This setting
provides an opportunistic motivation for the manager choosing the timing of investment in
the risky project. In contrast to Grenadier and Wang (2005), under agency conflicts over
investment timing, we show that even in the absence of hidden information, investment in
the project is delayed compared with the full information case. More importantly, we also
suggest that restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options in various circumstances,
although the optimal compensation contract derived in Grenadier and Wang is different
from that commonly used in practice. Because most of the other existing real options
models under agency conflicts assume that the managerial compensation contract is fixed
as given, they cannot determine the optimal compensation schedule that mitigates the
manager’s moral hazard decision regarding investment timing.4
4Mæland (2006) also considers a real options model of investment timing under agency conflicts with
endogenously determined compensation contracts. However, unlike our model, (i) there is no moral
hazard in the manager’s decision regarding investment timing because the owner can directly determine
the investment timing by choosing the trigger point, (ii) the manager’s compensation is paid only at
the investment trigger point, as in Grenadier and Wang (2005), and (iii) private information leads to
overinvestment for some parameter values, because the option value of investing decreases in time as
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As shown already, in our model, the commencement of the project is more likely to
be delayed if the probability of the project’s liquidation is greater. The effect of the
project liquidation possibility on the investment timing is also investigated in Lyandres
and Zhdanov (2010). However, they indicate that the possibility of default reduces the
value of the option to wait and provides equity holders with an incentive to speed up
investment. The difference between these results is because in Lyandres and Zhdanov
(2010), the loss of the investment opportunity arises in the event of default before the
investment cost has been paid, whereas in our model, the investment has been made and
the investment cost paid before the project liquidation event.
The analysis in this paper is also related to the literature on optimal contracting models
for CEO compensation (see Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Kadan and Swinkels (2008)).
However, these studies employ a static optimal contracting model. By contrast, our paper
is the first to solve the optimal contract offered by a firm in a continuous-time, real
options setting where a manager chooses the timing of investment. In our model, agency
conflicts in investment timing arise because the manager’s preferred timing of investment
differs from that of shareholders. The model can then derive an optimal structure for the
compensation contract that provides incentives for the manager to choose the appropriate
timing of investment in the risky project given these agency conflicts. In the static optimal
contracting model, it is difficult to handle the agency conflicts over timing. Hence, the
models imply that stock options are optimal if the manager is risk neutral or only has
moderate levels of risk aversion (Dittmann andMaug (2007)), or if the risk-averse manager
does not face higher bankruptcy risk (Kadan and Swinkels (2008)). By contrast, our model
suggests that restricted stock is optimal relative to stock options in various circumstances.
In addition, we clarify several economic conditions that make stock options more likely
to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock but that are not obtained in the
frameworks in either Dittmann and Maug (2007) or Kadan and Swinkels (2008). The
reason for this difference is that in our real options model, the choice between restricted
stock and stock options depends on whether the manager’s optimal timing of investment
is later than that of shareholders.
In addition, the standard view of option-based compensation is that stock option con-
tracts create incentives for risk taking. However, Ross (2004) has indicated that it is
private information evolves stochastically.
8
possible for the opposite to occur. Considering the possibility of loss aversion, de Meza
and Webb (2007) also suggest a new reason why option-based compensation may lessen
risk-taking behavior. In this paper, we further show that the manager’s moral hazard
incentive regarding the timing of investment provides a new reason that stock options
may make the manager less inclined to take risky investment actions than does restricted
stock compensation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and
derives the full information solution as a benchmark. Section 3.1 examines the manager’s
optimal trigger strategy given a compensation contract. Section 3.2 characterizes the
optimal compensation contract, and Section 3.3 discusses the comparative static results.
Section 4 considers extensions of the basic model and assesses the robustness of our main
results. Section 5 investigates the empirical implications of the model. The final section
concludes the paper. The proofs of all propositions and lemmas are provided in the
Appendix.
2. The Basic Model
2.1. Investment technology.–
We develop a continuous−time agency model in which a risk-neutral manager acts as
an agent for a firm. We also use the term ‘firm’ to denote the initial shareholders. The
manager has no personal financial resources, a reservation utility of zero, and limited
liability. The initial shareholders own the firm, and their objective is to maximize the
value of their payoff at time 0. The firm is all-equity financed and operates in capital
markets with no transaction costs, although the possibility of debt financing is examined
in Section 4.5. Investors, including the initial shareholders, may lend and borrow freely at
the risk-free rate r. However, we assume that the manager could be more impatient than
the initial shareholders and that payoffs are valued by the manager with the discount rate
r + ξ, where ξ ≥ 0.5 The case of the patient manager (ξ < 0) is discussed in Section 4.4.
We consider an investment project that only the manager can manage. Because the
manager has specific skills in administering the investment project, he has decision rights
over investment policies. Hence, the manager chooses the timing of the project start-up.
5For justification, see Grenadier and Wang (2005, Section 5).
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When the project is launched, the shareholders incur a fixed setup cost CS. If CS is a
monetary cost, the funds for CS are raised by issuing new equity to the initial shareholders.
As new equity is issued to the initial shareholders, we need not discuss how much of the
project should be financed with new equity or with cash (which equals revenues of the
assets already in place and owned by the initial shareholders). We normalize the total
number of outstanding shares to 1 after the issuing of new equity. In addition, the manager
must expend effort so that the launched project generates a cash flow stream following the
process of equation (1), defined below. The manager’s effort inflicts physical disutility CM
on him, which is measured in the same units as the firm’s cash flow. The effort disutility
cost CM creates incentives for the manager to choose an inefficient project start-up timing
from the viewpoint of the firm. The two costs, CS and CM , are sunk costs and make the
decision regarding project commencement irreversible.
Now, the firm’s instantaneous cash flow x is realized with probability 1 − ε when CS
and CM are expended, and it evolves as a geometric Brownian motion:
dx = μxdt+ σxdz, (1)
where μ ∈ [(1/2)σ2, r) is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in x
per unit of time,6 σ > 0 is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit of
time, and dz is the increment of a standard Wiener process (dz ∼ N (0, dt)). However,
there is a probability ε that no cash flow stream is generated even when CS and CM are
expended. We further assume that if CS is not expended or if CS is expended but CM is
not expended, no cash flow stream is generated with probability 1. The probability ε is
the probability that the project is liquidated after CS and CM are expended.7
For the information structure, we assume that the manager’s decision about whether to
expend CM is unobservable, whereas the shareholders’ decision about whether to expend
6The restriction r > μ is standard in the real options literature. The restriction μ ≥ 12σ2 ensures that
the firm is a growing firm. However, our results hold even in the case of a declining firm.
7Practically, ε may be viewed as a financial crisis risk, where the firm cannot start the project because
the situation of distress ruins the profit opportunities of the project after CS and CM are expended.
Alternatively, ε may be interpreted as an authorization or litigation risk, where the authority does not
allow the firm to start the project because of unexpected flaws in the project that are unrelated to the
manager’s effort decision but arise after CS and CM are expended. In addition, as discussed in Section
4.3, we can obtain almost the same result by considering the possibility of the loss of the investment
opportunity instead of the liquidation of the project.
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CS is observable and verifiable. All other variables, including the firm’s cash flow stream,
are publicly observed, and the diffusion process of x is common knowledge.
2.2. Contracts.–
As the manager chooses the threshold at which he starts the project, the firm needs
to motivate the manager to choose a project start-up timing that is appropriate for the
initial shareholders, by offering a compensation contract at time 0. Then, the firm might
make compensation conditional upon x and the commencement of the project. Because of
this, we might consider compensation contracts that yield the manager a bonus payment
of ω (> 0) if the project is commenced at x = x0, and 0 if the project is not commenced
or if the project is commenced at x 6= x0. If this kind of contract is feasible, the firm can
always induce the manager to select the most convenient timing of investment from the
viewpoint of the initial shareholders by adjusting ω and x0.
In fact, this kind of contract is infeasible because there is a probability ε of project
failure, such that a court of law has trouble judging whether the manager really disrupted
the process of expending the cost. Hence, even though the manager does not expend CM ,
he can claim that the firm should pay ω. Hence, this argument shows that the firm has
no incentive to offer the above type of general contingent contract.8
Because of these reasons, we examine the case where the compensation contract at
time 0 can be described by three parameters: the base salary at time 0, φ; the number of
options on the firm’s stock granted to the manager, α ∈ (0, 1] (expressed as a fraction of
all shares outstanding); and an exercise price, P (≥ 0). Thus, a compensation contract
can be represented by (φ,α, P ). Note that: (i) the case of P > 0 corresponds to stock
options, and (ii) the case of P = 0 corresponds to restricted stock.9 Indeed, α = 0 can
be excluded without loss of generality because the manager does not expend CM when
α = 0; thus, no cash flow stream is generated in this case. The restrictions on α and P
are naturally attributed to the inherent features of restricted stock or stock options.
In the present stage of the analysis, we mention the case of P < 0. If P < 0, stock
options are exercised immediately at time 0 using the options argument. The manager
8An alternative contract involves specifying a bonus payment ω contingent on the manager’s report
about his decision to expend CM . However, in our setting, the manager’s report on expending CM
imposes no obligations on him. Hence, the firm has no incentive to offer this class of contract.
9Using the options argument, stock options with P = 0 are immediately exercised at time 0. Hence,
they are viewed as restricted stock.
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has no incentive to delay exercising the stock options beyond time 0 because there is a
negative sunk cost, and the exercising of stock options is instantaneous. Hence, we can
view this case as a combination of restricted stock and a base salary at time 0. Thus,
without loss of generality, we can rule out this case.
Additionally, we impose the following restrictions on the contract (φ,α, P ). First, the
manager’s base salary at time 0 cannot be reduced below a certain threshold value. One
plausible economic reason for the sticky base salary restriction is limited liability. Because
we impose limited liability on the part of the manager, we add the sticky base salary
constraint φ ≥ 0 for simplicity.10 However, in Section 4.1, we relax the sticky base salary
constraint and show that our main results are preserved, particularly if the manager is
more impatient than the initial shareholders.
Second, even if the manager must pay a positive exercise price (P > 0) and does not
receive a sufficiently large base salary, the limited liability constraint can still hold at the
time the stock options are exercised. This is because the manager may be allowed to sell
part of the stock obtained by exercising stock options to pay the exercise price.11
Third, stock options are inalienable; that is, they cannot be sold, transferred, or assigned
to a third party. Furthermore, we assume that stock obtained by the manager through
exercising stock options cannot be sold, except for the purpose of paying the exercise
price.12 We also assume that restricted stock granted to the manager is not tradable.
This assumption is justified by the common practice that restricted stock cannot be
freely sold by company executives and that executives are routinely required (through
ownership guidelines imposed by the board) or pressured (by informed board requirements
or through the desire to signal to markets) to hold more company stock than would be
indicated by an optimal portfolio standpoint (see Hall and Murphy (2002)). Indeed, the
efficacy of stock-based compensation as an incentive tool depends on its ability to expose
the manager to the risks of the outcomes that his actions will produce. If the manager
was able to diversify, or could somehow negate this risk, stock-based compensation would
10This kind of assumption is imposed in Dittmann and Maug (2007) and Kadan and Swinkels (2008).
11Otherwise, the manager may use “cashless exercise programs”, under which he pays nothing and
simply receives the value of the spread between the market price and the exercise price in shares of the
company stock (see Hall and Murphy (2002)).
12In fact, because the assumption that the stock obtained by the manager through exercising stock
options cannot be traded makes stock options more advantageous to the shareholders, the relaxation of
this assumption does not modify our main results.
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not act as such an effective incentive instrument.
Finally, to obtain an analytical solution, we assume that there is no expiration date on
stock options.13 In addition, we assume that the firm pays dividends after the project
starts.14 We also assume that all granted options are allowed to vest whenever they are
granted.
2.3. The definition of equilibrium.–
The equilibrium of the game is represented as follows. (i) At time 0, the firm offers
the manager a compensation contract (φ,α, P ) to maximize the value of the shareholders’
payoff. (ii) The manager determines the threshold for launching the project and the
timing for exercising stock options to maximize the value of his payoff, given (φ,α, P ).
2.4. The full information solution.–
Before analyzing the equilibrium, we briefly review the full information solution used
as a benchmark. The full information solution is derived by maximizing the value of the
option to invest at x0, provided that the manager’s decision to expend the effort cost CM
is publicly observable, that the project commencement is directly determined by the firm,
and that the manager is compensated for CM so that he is induced to participate in the
project.
The following proposition characterizes the full information solution.
Proposition 1: Let xFI denote the full information trigger for the commencement of the
project, and let VFI (x) denote the full information value of the option to invest. Then,
xFI













r−μ − CS − CM
i
for x < xFI ,
(1−ε)x
r−μ − CS − CM for xFI ≤ x,
(3)




+ 2rσ2 > 1.
13As executive stock options typically have a 10-year expiration date, they are American call options
with finite expiration dates. However, it is difficult to find analytical solutions in this case. See Karatzas
and Shreve (1998) for details on the differences between American call options with finite expiration dates
and those with infinite expiration dates.
14The dividend payment rule is exogenous, as commonly assumed in the real options literature.
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Note that β1 is the positive root of the characteristic equation 12σ2q(q − 1) + μq =
r.15 In the full information case, the discount rate r is used because the firm directly
determines the timing of the project’s commencement.
Several remarks about this proposition are in order. First, because β1 > 1 and r > μ,
we have (1−ε)xFI
r−μ > CS + CM . In other words, because
(1−ε)x
r−μ must be large enough to
compensate for CS + CM , the firm does not start the project until the first time x reaches
the trigger xFI (>
r−μ
1−ε (CS + CM)). The intuitive reason is that there is an opportunity
cost associated with investing today that is created by irreversible investment and the
uncertain future value of x; that is, the option value of waiting to launch the project
implies an action threshold at which the expected value from investing exceeds the cost.




can be interpreted as a stochastic discount factor that constitutes the present
value of a dollar paid at the time of investment when the discount rate equals r. Finally,
xFI does not depend on the initial value of x0 because of the time-consistent structure of
our model. Hence, xFI is determined independently of time.
3. The Optimal Trigger Strategy and Compensation Contract
In this section, we discuss the impact of agency conflicts, provided that the manager’s
decision to expend CM is unobservable and that the project start-up timing is determined
by the manager. In the subsequent analysis, we work backward to derive the optimal
trigger strategy and the optimal compensation contract. We first explore the manager’s
maximization problem with respect to the trigger points for launching the project and
exercising stock options, and then examine the firm’s maximization problem with respect
to the compensation contract. Because we assume that no cash flow stream is generated
unless CM is expended, we can focus on the case where the manager always chooses to
expend CM at the launch of the project under (φ,α, P ) as long as his individual rationality
constraint is satisfied. Thus, we need not consider the incentive compatibility constraint
for the manager that induces him to expend CM at the launch of the project. This implies
that we focus on resolving the manager’s choice of project start-up timing strategy.
3.1. The optimal trigger strategy for a given compensation contract.–
15If β1 is the negative root, VFI (x) is decreasing in x, which contradicts the intuitive explanation.
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We need to divide the analysis into the following two cases: (i) the manager first starts
the project by expending CM , and then exercises stock options by paying P per share;
and (ii) the manager first exercises stock options by paying P per share, and then starts
the project by expending CM . Regardless of which case we deal with, we need to work
backward to find the solution because the manager’s problem is regarded as a two-stage
sequential maximization problem.
We begin by discussing the first case. As the manager exercises the stock options after
starting the project, we first solve the manager’s problem of when to exercise the stock
options, taking the compensation contract as given. The stock options examined here can
be regarded as American call options with dividends and infinite expiration dates because
we have assumed that there is no expiration date for the stock options and that the firm
pays dividends after the project starts. After finding the value of the stock options held
by the manager, along with the trigger value of x at which the manager exercises the stock
options, we next proceed to solve the manager’s problem of when to launch the project,
and derive the value of the manager’s option to launch the project and the trigger value of
x for the project’s commencement. At this stage, given the value of the stock options held
by the manager and the corresponding trigger value of x for exercising the stock options,
the value of the manager’s option to launch the project is determined. Hence, our two-
stage sequential maximization problem is to find the value of the compound options.
Indeed, using the result of Dixit and Pindyck (1994, Chapter 10.1), we can show that
if P > 0, the commencement of the project and the decision to exercise the stock options
occur simultaneously. In other words, it will never be the case that the manager will start
the project and then wait, rather than also exercising the stock options.16 Intuitively,
the manager need not delay exercising the stock options, not only because the project
start-up and the exercising of stock options are instantaneous but also because there are
no other impediments to taking these actions simultaneously in any stage. Given this
finding, we can transform the two-stage sequential maximization problem into a one-
stage maximization problem in which the manager simultaneously launches the project
and exercises the stock options by expending CM and paying P per share.
Similarly, using the result of Dixit and Pindyck (1994), we can prove that if P > 0, the
16More specifically, the optimal solution indicates that the trigger level for launching the project in
the first stage is larger than that for exercising the stock options in the second stage. As a result, the
commencement of the project and the decision to exercise the stock options occur simultaneously.
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project start-up and the exercising of stock options occur simultaneously, even though we
deal with the second case. Thus, if P > 0, irrespective of the case we examine, we need
only consider the one-stage maximization problem in which the manager simultaneously
launches the project and exercises the stock options by expending CM and paying P per
share.
If P = 0, the stock options are exercised immediately at time 0 and are reduced to
restricted stock, as argued in Section 2.2. However, the manager’s maximization problem
for P = 0 is the same as that for P > 0, except that the manager need not pay P per
share at the start of the project. In other words, if P = 0, the two-stage sequential
maximization problem is reduced to a one-stage maximization problem with respect to
the timing of the project’s start-up (and simultaneous exercising of the stock options).
Let x∗ denote the optimal trigger value of x at which the manager launches the project,
and let G(x) denote the value of the option to start the project for the manager. Now,
solving the transformed one-stage maximization problem of the manager, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: If a contract (φ,α, P ) is given, then x∗ and G(x) are
x∗




























− CM for x∗ ≤ x,
(5)




+ 2(r+ξ)σ2 > β1 > 1.
Note that γ1 is the positive root of the characteristic equation 12σ2q(q − 1) + μq = r
+ ξ. In this case, the discount rate r + ξ is used because the manager determines the
project start-up timing.
Several remarks are in order. First, and as explained in Proposition 1, the option value
for the manager of waiting to launch the project implies an action threshold, x∗, where
the expected value for the manager from investing, α(1−ε)x
∗
r+ξ−μ , exceeds the cost, CM + α(1 −








manager is more likely to exercise the stock options deeper in the money, as γ1 is smaller,
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CM is larger, α is smaller, P is smaller, and ε is smaller. Third, x∗ increases with CM
and ε. Furthermore, x∗ increases in P but decreases in α. This implies that decreasing P
while increasing α induces the manager to launch the project earlier because the value of





¢γ1 can again be interpreted as a stochastic discount factor that constitutes
the present value of a dollar paid at the time of investment when the discount rate equals
r + ξ. Furthermore, it follows that ¡ x
x∗
¢γ1 ≤ ¡ x
x∗
¢β1 because x < x∗ and γ1 ≥ β1. This
shows that a dollar received at the stopping time described by the trigger strategy x∗ is
worth less to the manager than to the initial shareholders.
3.2. The optimal contract.–
To formalize the firm’s maximization problem, we need to specify the values of the
shareholders’ and manager’s payoffs at time 0, given a contract (φ,α, P ) and the manager’s
optimal trigger point x∗, derived in Proposition 2.
Let WS(x0) and WM(x0) denote the values of the shareholders’ and manager’s payoffs
at time 0, respectively. To simplify the analysis and to focus on the more interesting case,
we assume that x0 is not sufficiently large, so that x0 < x∗.17 Then, using Proposition 2
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Note that if the contract relation is organized, the firm pays the fixed base salary φ to
the manager at time 0.









r − μ + α(1− ε)P − CS
¸¾
, (6)
17The sufficient condition for this is that (1 − ε)x0 < β1β1−1
h
(r − μ)CS + γ1γ1−1(r + ξ − μ)CM
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φ ≥ 0, (BS)
1 ≥ α > 0, (SR)
P ≥ 0. (EP)
Here, the objective function is provided by WS(x0). (IC) characterizes the incentive
compatibility constraint for the manager with respect to x, which means that x∗ is derived
from (4) in Proposition 2. (IR) expresses the individual rationality constraint for the man-
ager, which guarantees that WM(x0) is larger than or equal to the manager’s reservation
utility of zero. (BS) is the sticky base salary constraint, (SR) is the restriction on the
shareholding ratios of the shareholders and the manager, and (EP) is the nonnegativity
restriction on the exercise price of stock options. Note that as long as (IR) holds, we need
not consider the incentive compatibility constraint for the manager that induces him to
expend CM , as argued at the beginning of this section.
Now, we show the following lemma:
Lemma 1: (IR) is not binding.
The intuition for the result of Lemma 1 is that the expected value for the manager from
investing, α(1−ε)x
∗
r+ξ−μ , exceeds the cost, CM + α(1 − ε)P , because of (IC) and γ1 > 1. As
this, together with (BS), implies φ + ¡x0
x∗





> 0, (IR) is
never binding. This intuition is also related to the investment rule of the standard real
options model: the option is exercised at a trigger where the option value is positive.
Let (φ∗,α∗, P ∗) denote the solution to problem (6). Using Lemma 1, we obtain the
following proposition.







(r − μ)CS + γ1γ1 − 1(r + ξ − μ)CM
¸
> xFI . (7)
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Furthermore, restricted stock dominates stock options and the base salary, so the optimal
compensation contract is characterized by
φ∗ = P ∗ = 0 and α∗ = β1 − 1β1
γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM
(γ1 − 1)(r − μ)CS + γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM . (8)




´β1 ∙ β1(γ1 − 1)(r − μ)CS + γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM
β1(γ1 − 1)(r − μ)CS + β1γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM
(1− ε)x∗







´γ1 ∙β1 − 1
β1
γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM
(γ1 − 1)(r − μ)CS + γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM
(1− ε)x∗




The implications and intuitions for this proposition are as follows. First, the optimal
commencement trigger x∗ is larger than the full information commencement trigger, xFI ,
irrespective of whether γ1 > β1 or γ1 = β1. The reason is that the grant size of restricted
stock under the optimal contract α∗ is smaller than that required to attain xFI .18 This
is because there is a trade-off between the increasing incentives to commence the project
earlier and the increasing dilution costs relating to the larger grant size of restricted stock.
As a result, the manager cannot fully internalize the benefits of the more efficient timing
of investment. As an increase in the start-up trigger beyond xFI raises the value of the
manager’s option to launch the project, he has an incentive for this when x∗ > xFI .
Second, the exercise price P ∗ is set to zero. As suggested, the project start-up and the
exercising of stock options occur simultaneously, not only because they are instantaneous
but also because there are no other impediments to taking the actions simultaneously
in any stage. Then, there are two effects when P increases. One effect is that the
firm’s revenues generated by the exercise price payment from the manager increase. This
increases the value of the shareholders’ option to launch the project. The other effect is
that the trigger point for commencing the project increases because the manager must pay
the higher P as a sunk cost. Thus, increasing P induces the manager to delay launching
the project. The delay reduces the value of the shareholders’ option to launch the project.








Indeed, as indicated, x∗ is greater than xFI , so that the manager’s optimal investment
trigger is larger than that of the shareholders. The second effect always dominates the
first because the positive exercise price further deters investment.
Third, the base salary φ∗ is set to zero. It follows from (IC) and γ1 > 1 that the
individual rationality constraint is not binding because the expected value for the manager
from investing exceeds the cost at x∗. Hence, an increase in φ only decreases the value of
the shareholders’ payoff at time 0 because it does not affect any of the incentives for the
manager to start the project. Thus, it is evident from the sticky base salary constraint
that φ∗ = 0.
Several remarks about this proposition are in order. First, the project is commenced
at a higher trigger level than xFI , irrespective of whether γ1 > β1 or γ1 = β1. Indeed, as
long as the manager’s moral hazard motive exists, or as long as the manager’s effort cost
exists (CM > 0), the trigger is determined at a higher level than xFI . This perspective is
not discussed in Grenadier and Wang’s (2005) real options model, because they consider
a setting in which the shareholders could directly determine the commencement trigger
when CM = 0. Hence, in their model of hidden action only, all the trigger levels are
determined at the full information level, regardless of whether γ1 > β1 or γ1 = β1. As
a result, the trigger levels in their model are unaffected by the consideration of hidden
action.
Second, the ratio x
∗
xFI
or the difference x∗ − xFI measures the relative inefficiency of the










(> 1), the manager’s
trigger policy becomes less efficient as the setup cost of the shareholders CS decreases
or the effort cost of the manager CM increases. It also follows from Proposition 4 in
the next subsection that the manager’s trigger policy becomes less efficient as managerial
impatience ξ decreases if σ is sufficiently large. Although x∗
xFI
is independent of the
liquidation probability ε, x∗ − xFI is increasing in ε. Hence, the greater probability of
liquidation causes the manager’s trigger policy to become less efficient.
Third, stock options are never optimal under the basic model setting. Instead, restricted
stock is optimal, even with the manager’s risk-neutral preferences. Furthermore, this
result holds regardless of whether the manager is as patient as–or more patient than–the
initial shareholders (γ1 = β1 or γ1 > β1). Option-based compensation is often criticized
for inducing “too much” risk taking by the manager. However, Ross (2004) indicates
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that the implicit assumption behind this argument is that the manager’s von Neumann—
Morgenstern utility function has the same risk aversion over the entire relevant domain
of outcomes. If not, he suggests that it is ambiguous whether option-based compensation
encourages risk taking. De Meza and Webb (2007) also argue that the presence of loss
aversion provides a further reason why risk taking may be lower with an option contract
than with a share or other incentive scheme that does not protect against the downside.
In this paper, we show that the manager’s moral hazard incentive regarding the timing of
investment gives another reason why stock options may make the manager less inclined
to take risky investment actions than does restricted stock.
3.3. Comparative statics.–
We examine the effects of the key parameters of the model on x∗ and α∗, given by
Proposition 3. The key parameters are the liquidation probability ε, the volatility of the
firm’s cash flow stream σ, the manager’s effort cost CM , and the degree of managerial
impatience ξ. As has been discussed, the parameter ε may be viewed as the financial crisis
risk or the authorization and litigation risk. σ may be interpreted as the uncertainty of
the business environment that the firm faces. CM may be the proxy for the complexity of
the manager’s task. ξ may represent the manager’s concerns about the firm’s short-term
performance or the threat to the manager from a stochastic termination, as suggested by
Grenadier and Wang (2005). If ξ is reduced when the manager has more job opportunities
outside of the firm, ξ becomes smaller as the managerial labor market becomes deeper.
Given the results of Proposition 3, we first obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4: (i) x∗ is increasing in ε, σ, and CM . If σ is sufficiently large, x∗ is
decreasing in ξ.
(ii) α∗ is independent of ε and increasing in CM . In addition, if ξ = 0 so that γ1 = β1,
then α∗ is decreasing in σ. If σ is sufficiently large, α∗ is decreasing in ξ.
Result (i) indicates that the commencement trigger x∗ becomes higher as ε, σ, and
CM increase. A larger ε implies a greater liquidation probability, which raises the risk of
losing the sunk cost upon liquidation and thus increases the required excess returns before
launching the project. This increases x∗, all else being equal. In addition, for a given α,




¢γ1 if x∗ is determined as
in (4). This increases the value of the manager’s option to wait, thereby motivating the
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manager to exercise the option to start the project later. The result that x∗ is increasing
in CM is evident. By contrast, result (i) shows that when ξ increases, x∗ decreases if σ is
sufficiently large. This is because the greater managerial impatience then decreases the
value of the manager’s option to wait. Hence, an increase in ξ induces earlier start-up of
the project.
Result (ii) shows that the grant size of restricted stock α∗ is independent of ε. Because
an increase in the liquidation probability merely raises the risk of losing the sunk cost upon
liquidation, the expected value for the manager from investing, (1−ε)x
∗
r+ξ−μ , is independent of
ε for a given α if x∗ is determined by (4). As ε does not affect any of the incentives
for the manager to invest, the firm has no incentive to adjust the size of α so as to
internalize the effect of ξ. However, result (ii) indicates that α∗ increases with CM . It is
not surprising that the larger CM leads to the larger α∗ because the manager needs to be
more compensated when CM is larger. Furthermore, result (ii) suggests that α∗ decreases
with σ if γ1 = β1. A larger σ increases the value of the manager’s option to wait, as
stated above. If the manager’s impatience is not too different from the shareholders’
(γ1 ' β1), an increase in σ reduces the size of α used in the contract because this effect of
σ reduces the efficacy of restricted stock in motivating the manager to choose an earlier
launching time for the project. However, if managerial impatience is sufficiently great,
the firm may have to grant more α to compensate the manager for a decline in the option
value (of investing) for the manager caused by a rise in σ. Result (ii) also implies that
α∗ decreases in ξ if σ is sufficiently large. Because greater managerial impatience then
gives the manager more incentive to launch the project earlier for a given α, the firm can
reduce the grant size α used in the contract.
4. Robustness Checks
We now consider whether our main results remain valid, even when some of the as-
sumptions made in the previous sections are modified.
4.1. Negative base salaries.–
Proposition 3 depends on the existence of the sticky base salary constraint, which does
not allow for negative base salaries. Negative base salaries occur when managers invest
some of their initial wealth in their company’s securities. If base salaries can be neg-
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ative, we interpret this to mean that the contract requires managers to invest some of
their private savings, in addition to their stock grants, in their company’s securities. In
fact, it seems very rare to specify a contract whereby managers must invest some of their
private savings in the company’s securities. In particular, we can almost entirely exclude
this possibility for large publicly traded firms. However, if we allow base salaries to be
negative, we present the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Suppose that φ is allowed to be negative.
(i) If γ1 > β1, the optimal compensation contract, (φ∗,α∗, P ∗), is characterized by φ∗ =
− ¡x0
x∗
¢γ1 CMγ1−1 , 0 < α∗ < 1, and P ∗ = 0. In addition, if ξ is not sufficiently large, the
optimal start-up trigger, x∗, must satisfy x∗ > xFI .




¢β1 CM (CS+CM )
(β1−1)[CS+CM−(1−ε)P∗] ,
α∗ = CM
CS+CM−(1−ε)P∗ , and 0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ CS1−ε .
Even though base salaries are allowed to be negative, Proposition 5 suggests the follow-
ing if the manager is more impatient than the initial shareholders (γ1 > β1). The optimal
contract is made up of restricted stock but does not involve stock options, and the optimal
trigger x∗ is larger than that at the full information level xFI if the manager’s and the
shareholders’ impatience levels are not too different. Only if γ1 = β1, is xFI attained, and
the optimal contract cannot exclude stock options. Note that α∗ = 1 if P ∗ = CS
1−ε . Then,
the optimal contract implies that the manager buys all the stock of the firm. Hence, as
suggested in the static contract model, the full information allocation is achieved.
In the case of γ1 = β1, the achievement of xFI implies that the moral hazard problem
of the manager is fully resolved in this case. The indifference between restricted stock and
stock options also depends on the fact that the choice of restricted stock or stock options
does not affect any incentives for the manager to launch the project if base salaries can
be negative. Indeed, if γ1 = β1 and base salaries can be negative, these results are trivial
because we end up analyzing the model without any limited liability constraints for the
risk-neutral manager.
By contrast, the optimal contract does not involve stock options in the case of γ1 >
β1. The greater managerial impatience γ1 > β1 induces the firm not to set base salaries
to be sufficiently negative because the firm needs to award the manager compensation as
early as possible. This also implies that the firm needs to decrease the total compensation
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for the manager in this case by minimizing the exercise price; that is, by fixing P ∗ at 0.
Furthermore, as the firm cannot set base salaries to be sufficiently negative, the grant
size of restricted stock under the optimal contract must be smaller than that required to
attain the full information allocation. This indirect effect, which raises the start trigger
through a decrease in the grant size of restricted stock, dominates the direct effect of the
greater managerial impatience, which may decrease the start trigger. Hence, x∗ is larger
than xFI .
These findings show that when the manager chooses the project start-up timing, our
results–that restricted stock is optimal and x∗ is larger than xFI–depend on the moral
hazard incentive for the risk-neutral manager, as long as he is more impatient than the
initial shareholders and is also constrained by the limited liability. However, if the manager
is as impatient as the initial shareholders (γ1 = β1) and if there is no lower bound on
how much the manager can be paid (φ < 0), the firm can fix the optimal commencement
trigger at xFI and can be indifferent between restricted stock and stock options, because
the firm can resolve the moral hazard incentive for the risk-neutral manager even though
CM > 0.19
4.2. The endogenous choice of the volatility.–
In the previous sections, we assume that the volatility of the project is exogenously
fixed. However, if the manager can choose to decrease or increase the volatility of the
project, at the expense of a steady expected cash flow, the result of the dominance of
restricted stock over stock options might be affected under certain circumstances.
To clarify this point, we assume that the manager has the option of choosing the
project’s volatility level as either σA or σB. If the manager chooses σj, the corresponding
μ in (1) is μj (j = A,B). In the subsequent analysis, we need not specify any relation
between σj and μj to prove our result. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
shareholders prefer to induce the manager to choose σA.
Let x∗j denote the optimal trigger value of x at which the manager launches the project
when the manager chooses σj (j = A,B). Then, if the manager is induced to choose σA,
19By contrast, in the static contracting model, tightening the limited liability constraint makes stock
options more advantageous. See Dittmann and Maug (2007).
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φ ≥ 0, 1 ≥ α > 0, P ≥ 0, (LLR)
where βA = 12 − μAσ2A +




+ 2(r+ξ)σ2j for j
= A,B.
Here, the objective function is provided by WS(x0) if the manager chooses σA. (ICx∗A)
((ICx∗B)) characterizes the incentive compatibility constraint for the manager with respect
to x∗A (x∗B), which means that x∗A (x∗B) is derived from (4) of Proposition 2 for γ1 = γA (γ1 =
γB). (ICσ2) represents the incentive compatibility constraint for the manager with respect
to σ2. (IRA) ((IRB)) expresses the individual rationality constraint for the manager,
which guarantees thatWM(x0) is larger than or equal to the manager’s reservation utility
of zero if the manager chooses σA (σB). Note that as long as (IRA) ((IRB)) holds, we
need not consider the incentive compatibility constraint for the manager that induces him
to expend CM if the manager chooses σA (σB), as argued at the beginning of Section 3.
Finally, (LLR) corresponds to the conditions (BS), (SR), and (EP) in problem (6).
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Solving the firm’s maximization problem, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6: Even though the manager optimally chooses the volatility of the cash
flow, restricted stock dominates stock options and the base salary.
Intuitively, even though the manager’s volatility choice is endogenous, the incentive
compatibility constraint for the manager with respect to the volatility has no effect on
the choice of P . Therefore, the result of the dominance of restricted stock over stock
options and the base salary is unaffected by endogenizing the manager’s choice of the
volatility of the cash flow.
4.3. The possibility of the loss of the investment opportunity.–
In the previous sections, we have assumed that a project’s failure, corresponding to
zero cash flow for the firm, always occurs immediately after its commencement, according
to some fixed probability. Instead, we may assume that the investment opportunity can
be lost at any given point in time with some probability. However, if the investment
opportunity is observable and verifiable, the ‘general’ contract mentioned in Section 2.2
is feasible because the commencement of the project is also verifiable by outside parties.
Hence, the firm can offer a compensation contract that yields the manager a bonus pay-
ment ω if the project is commenced at x = x0, and 0 if the project is not commenced
at all or if the project is commenced at x 6= x0. As a result, if the investment opportu-
nity is lost at any given point in time with some probability, the firm can always induce
the manager to choose the most convenient investment timing from the viewpoint of the
initial shareholders. Hence, the firm need not use any kind of stock-based compensation.
On the other hand, if the loss of the investment opportunity is not verifiable, the firm
needs to use stock-based compensation contracts because the firm cannot use the above
‘general’ contract. To analyze the effect of the loss of the investment opportunity in this
case, let us denote by λ the hazard rate for the loss of the investment opportunity. Then,
the probability that the loss of the investment opportunity will occur at time t is given
by e−λt, while the probability that the loss will not occur at time t is given by 1 − e−λt.
Repeating the arguments of Sections 2 and 3, we can show that the results of Propositions
1—3 still hold, although (i) the terms r − μ and r + ξ − μ in Propositions 1—3 are replaced









+ 2(r+λ+ξ)σ2 . Hence, even though
26
the loss of the investment opportunity is not verifiable, the result of the dominance of
restricted stock over stock options and the base salary is unaffected.20
4.4. Patient manager.–
Even though the manager is less impatient than the shareholders (ξ < 0), the logic of
P ∗ = 0 in Proposition 3 holds as long as ξ is not so small that γ > 1. Hence, although the
manager is less impatient than the shareholders, restricted stock continues to dominate
stock options and the base salary if the manager’s discount rate is not sufficiently small
relative to the shareholders’ discount rate.
4.5. Debt financing.–
In the previous sections, the firm does not finance investment projects with risky debt.
However, if we consider the possibility of debt financing, our main results may not be
robust. In Section 4.5.1, we first discuss the effect of new debt financing when the firm
has no debt before the commencement of the project. In Section 4.5.2, we clarify the
implications of the presence of already outstanding debt when the firm issues debt before
the start of the project.
4.5.1. New debt financing To examine this case, we need to modify the basic model.
First, we assume that the firm issues perpetual debt with principal D to finance part of
the investment project and must make a fixed instantaneous contractual coupon payment
s to debt holders at any point of time. For simplicity, we assume that the coupon payment
s is predetermined, although the firm’s debt level is endogenously determined at a level
that induces debt holders to participate in the debt market.21 Second, we assume that full
debt service s is obtained by lenders as long as the firm continues to be viable. However,
if the firm fails to service the debt, the lenders take over the firm. Hence, the value of
equity at default is zero. Third, we abstract from bankruptcy costs. Finally, like the
20Instead of assuming the hazard rate function, we can characterize the effect of the loss of the in-
vestment opportunity by the following mixed Brownian motion jump process: dxt = μxtdt + σxtdzt +
xtdyt. Here, dyt is the following Poisson process, for which the arrival time of the loss of the investment
opportunity follows a Poisson distribution: dyt = 0 with probability 1 − λdt; and dyt = −1 with proba-
bility λdt. Note that dzt and dyt are independent. Using this stochastic process, we can derive the same
result as that in the case of the hazard rate function. For a discussion of the jump process, see Dixit and
Pindyck (1994).
21If D < CS , the remaining amount of CS −D is financed by equity. If CS < D, the excess amount of
funds D − CS is saved at the interest rate r.
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investment decision, the manager makes the decision on whether to default on the loan.
Given the above modifications, the manager’s optimization is given by





e−(r+ξ)tα(1− ε)(xt − s)dt− e−(r+ξ)Ti [α(1− ε)P + CM ]
¾
+ φ,
where E is the expectation operator, Ti is a stopping time at which the investment option
is exercised, and Td is a stopping time at which the default option is exercised (after
the investment). Let (T ∗i , T ∗d ) denote the optimal stopping times. Indeed, as shown
in the previous sections, the optimal stopping time rule is expressed in the form of the
optimal thresholds; namely, the optimal investment threshold, x∗i , and the optimal default
threshold, x∗d.
Given (T ∗i , T ∗d ) and x∗i , the shareholders’ (or the firm’s) optimization problem can be
written as




e−rt(1− α)(1− ε)(xt − s)dt+ e−rT ∗i [α(1− ε)P − CS +D(x∗i )]
)
−φ.
Here, D(xi) is the value of the debt when the investment option is exercised.
As in the previous sections, we now work backward to derive the optimal trigger strate-
gies and compensation contract. We first explore the manager’s maximization problem
with respect to the trigger point for defaulting on the loan after investing in the project.
The following proposition gives the optimal default threshold, the value of the manager’s
payoff at the time the investment option is exercised, and the value of debt at the time
the investment option is exercised.
Proposition 7: The optimal default trigger is
x∗d




r + ξ <
s
r + ξ , (12)
where γ2 is the negative root of the characteristic equation 12σ2q(q − 1) + μq = r + ξ;




+ 2(r+ξ)σ2 . If the investment option is exercised, the
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where β2 is the negative root of the characteristic equation 12σ2q(q − 1) + μq = r; that





We next examine the manager’s maximization problem with respect to the trigger
point for launching the project. The following proposition yields the optimal investment
threshold and the values of the shareholders’ and the manager’s payoffs at time 0.
Proposition 8: The optimal investment trigger satisfies
x∗i






















If the investment option is exercised, the values of the shareholders’ and the manager’s
payoffs at time 0 are



































































subject to (15), W bM(x0) ≥ 0, φ ≥ 0, 1 ≥ α > 0, and P ≥ 0. Note that (15) is the
incentive-compatibility condition for the manager, W bM(x0) ≥ 0 is the individual rational-
ity condition for the manager, and the final three constraints correspond to the conditions
(BS), (SR), and (EP) in problem (6).
Solving problem (18), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 9: Suppose that ξ (≥ 0) is sufficiently small. Then, P = φ = 0 as long as
the investment option is exercised. Hence, even though debt financing is used, restricted
stock still dominates stock options and the base salary.
Intuitively, if ξ is sufficiently small, the option value of investing at the optimal in-
vestment trigger is positive for the manager, even when evaluated at the shareholders’
discount rate, although we do consider the coupon payment and the default loss. Then,
the shareholders prefer to induce the manager to exercise the investment option as early
as possible. Thus, the exercise price must be set to zero. Hence, even though debt financ-
ing is exploited, restricted stock becomes better at providing the manager with a greater
incentive to launch the risky project because it does not force the manager to pay any
positive exercise price.
However, if ξ is not sufficiently small, the option value of investing at the optimal invest-
ment trigger may be negative for the manager when it is evaluated at the shareholders’
discount rate, because the discounted values of the coupon payment and the default loss
may be sufficiently large. In this case, the shareholders do not prefer to induce the man-
ager to exercise the investment option as early as possible. Hence, the exercise price need
not be necessarily zero. Therefore, if the manager’s discount rate is sufficiently larger than
the shareholders’ rate, the exercise price may be positive, so that stock options dominate
restricted stock.
Realistically, managers in reorganized firms are more concerned about the firms’ short-
term performance, while the outstanding debt of these firms is likely to be abandoned.
Hence, if these firms issue new debt, stock options would be preferred to restricted stock
as compensation for the managers.
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4.5.2. Outstanding debt22 If there is outstanding debt before the start of the project,
Lyandres and Zhdanov (2010) suggest that the accelerated investment effect of debt leads
to a positive relation between the firm’s coupon rate and the speed of the exercise of its
investment option. This effect crucially depends on the assumption that the investment
opportunity is lost given the default of debt from the shareholders’ perspective. As a
result, the presence of outstanding debt before the start of the project reduces the value of
the option to wait and induces the willingness of shareholders to exercise their investment
option earlier. However, the same mechanism works for the manager when he is awarded
stock-based compensation. Hence, if the shareholders are more willing to exercise their
investment option earlier than the manager, restricted stock dominates stock options from
the shareholders’ perspective because the positive exercise price delays the manager’s
investment timing further; otherwise, stock options dominate restricted stock.
4.6. Multiple projects.–
Our basic model can be extended to the case of multiple projects, in which there is
more than one potential investment opportunity available. Suppose that the manager has
the option of commencing two projects, j = m, n. If he commences project j, the firm’s
instantaneous cash flow xj is realized with probability 1−εj when the investment cost CSj
and the manager’s effort cost CMj are expended, and evolves as a geometric Brownian
motion:
dxj = μjxjdt+ σjxjdzj, (19)
where μj ∈ [(1/2)σ2, r) is the instantaneous conditional expected percentage change in
xj per unit of time, σj > 0 is the instantaneous conditional standard deviation per unit of
time, and dzj is the increment of a standard Wiener process (dzj ∼ N (0, dt)). However,
there is a probability εj that no cash flow stream is generated, even when CSj and CMj
are expended. We further assume that if CSj is not expended or if CSj is expended but
CMj is not expended, then the probability that no cash flow stream is generated is 1. For
simplicity, dzm and dzn are independently distributed.
In this case, in order to finance the investment cost and to motivate the manager, we
consider the following equity finance and compensation contracts. At time 0, the firm
issues equity to the initial shareholders on the condition that the initial shareholders pay
22This discussion follows the suggestion from an anonymous referee.
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CSm when project m is commenced. Then, the firm offers the manager a compensation
contract: a base salary at time 0, φ (≥ 0); a number of options on the firm’s stock
granted to the manager if project m is commenced, α ∈ (0, 1]; and an exercise price for
stock options if project m is commenced, P (≥ 0). At the commencement of project n,
in order to finance the investment cost CSn, the firm issues new equity and distributes
it on a pro rata basis to the initial shareholders and the manager. Thus, this framework
captures a situation in which the time at which the manager exercises the investment
option does not necessarily coincide with the time at which he exercises the stock option.
Without loss of generality, we assume that project m is commenced before project n.
For simplicity, we also assume that the commencement of projectm is not required before
commencing project n.
Now, under the above setting, the manager’s optimization can be formalized by









e−(r+ξ)tα(1− εn)xndt− e−(r+ξ)Tni [αCSn + CMn]
¾
+ φ,
where (xm0, xn0) is the initial value of (xm, xn) at time 0, E is the expectation operator,
and Tji is a stopping time at which project j is commenced. Let (T ∗mi, T ∗ni) denote the
optimal stopping times.
Given (T ∗mi, T ∗ni), the shareholders’ (or the firm’s) optimization problem can also be
characterized by








e−rt(1− α)(1− εn)xndt− e−rT ∗ni(1− α)CSn
)
− φ.
As in the previous sections, the optimal stopping time rule is again expressed in the
form of the optimal threshold: the optimal investment threshold of the project j, x∗ji,
at which the manager launches the project j. Because xm and xn evolve independently,
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r + ξ − μn − αCSn − CMn
¸
≥ 0, (IRmn)
φ ≥ 0, 1 ≥ α > 0, P ≥ 0, (LLR)










+ 2(r+ξ)σ2j for j =
m,n.
Here, the objective function is the value of the shareholders’ payoff at time 0, (ICj) is the
incentive compatibility constraint for the manager with respect to x∗j (j = m,n), (IRn) is
the individual rationality constraint for the manager upon the commencement of project
n, and (IRmn) is the individual rationality constraint for the manager at time 0. Note
that as long as (IRn) and (IRmn) hold, we need not consider any incentive compatibility
constraints for the manager that induce him to expend αCSn, CMm, and CMn, as argued
at the beginning of Section 3. Finally, (LLR) corresponds to the conditions (BS), (SR),
and (EP) in problem (6).
As shown in Section 3.2, neither (IRn) nor (IRmn) is binding. This intuition is again
related to the investment rule of the standard real options model: the option is exercised
at a trigger where the option value is positive. Hence, we can set φ to zero.
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Now, using the arguments of Proposition 3, we can obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 10: In the case of multiple projects, suppose that CMn is sufficiently small
relative to CSn. Then, P = φ = 0. Hence, restricted stock dominates stock options and
the base salary.
Proposition 10 suggests that although the time at which the manager exercises the
investment option does not necessarily coincide with the time at which he exercises the
stock option, the result of the dominance of restricted stock over stock options and the
base salary is unaffected, if the manager’s effort cost for the later projectCMn is sufficiently
small relative to the investment cost for the later project CSn.
Intuitively, if CMn is not sufficiently small relative to CSn, α may strongly affect x∗n;
that is,
¯¯¯∂x∗n∂α ¯¯¯ is sufficiently large. Because α may have a strong effect on both x∗m and
x∗n, it may be difficult for the firm to attain the appropriate levels of x∗m and x∗n only by
adjusting α. As a result, the firm may have an incentive to exploit P in order to attain
the appropriate levels of x∗m and x∗n. Therefore, in this case, stock options may dominate
restricted stock; otherwise, restricted stock dominates stock options.
In practice, we can view firms with several independent projects as diversified firms.
In addition, the higher CMn relative to CSn can be interpreted such that the start of
the additional project involves complicated tasks. Indeed, Berry et al. (2006) find that
diversified firms draw their chief executives from a new talented labor pool. Hence, the
argument in this subsection suggests that stock options are more likely to dominate re-
stricted stock in diversified firms that require higher managerial skills (e.g., in financial
conglomerates).
4.7. Empire-building tendencies23.–
Suppose that the manager can obtain private benefits from the start of the project
because the board of directors has not enough power to prevent his empire-building ten-
dencies. This extension can easily be incorporated into the basic model in Section 2 by
setting CM = C 0M − Γ, where C 0M is the manager’s effort cost and Γ is the private benefit
of the manager. If Γ is sufficiently large, then CM < 0, which may lead to the positive
exercise price (see the proof of Proposition 3).
In practice, firms with higher Γ can be viewed as firms with weaker corporate gov-
23This discussion follows the suggestion of an anonymous referee.
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ernance. Hence, this discussion implies that stock options are more likely to dominate
restricted stock in firms with weaker corporate governance.
5. The Empirical Implications
Proposition 4 provides several predictions about investment decisions.
Prediction 1: Investment becomes more deterred as (i) financial crisis risk or authoriza-
tion and litigation risk becomes higher, (ii) the volatility of the firm’s cash flow stream
becomes greater, (iii) the manager’s task becomes more complicated, and (iv) managerial
impatience becomes weaker, if the volatility of the firm’s cash flow stream is sufficiently
large.
Many empirical studies on real options examine the effect of uncertainty on the investment—
capital ratio rather than on investment timing. Carruth, Dickerson, and Henley (2000)
provide a review of the empirical literature on real options investigating the relationship
between the investment—capital ratio and proxy measures of uncertainty. A general con-
clusion is that increased uncertainty leads to a lower investment—capital ratio, at both the
aggregate and disaggregate levels. Several recent empirical studies on real options have
followed a similar approach. For example, Czarnitzki and Toole (2011) find that firm-level
R&D investment falls in response to higher levels of uncertainty. Other recent empirical
studies have attempted to test whether uncertainty reduces the likelihood of investment
action. For instance, using plant-level data, Drakos and Kostantinou (2013) suggest that
increases in the uncertainty of the real oil price significantly reduce the likelihood of in-
vestment action. Irrespective of the differences in estimation procedure, the results of
these empirical studies are consistent with our statement of the effect of the volatility of
the firm’s cash flow on investment decisions.
Bloom, Bond, and van Reenen (2007) provide evidence that, with irreversibility, greater
uncertainty reduces the variation of the investment level relative to the capital stock in
response to demand shocks. Because their finding can be interpreted as implying that
the greater uncertainty reduces the responsiveness of the timing of investment to demand
shocks, their estimate is also consistent with the above prediction regarding the volatility
of the firm’s cash flow stream.
The other statements in Prediction 1 provide new empirical implications. They suggest
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that the investment—capital ratio or the likelihood of investment action can be reduced
as the financial crisis risk or the authorization and litigation risk becomes higher, as
the manager’s task becomes more complicated, or as managerial short-termism becomes
weaker. In particular, Berry et al. (2006) find that diversified firms draw their chief
executives from a new talented labor pool because these firms require higher managerial
skills. Hence, Prediction 1(iii) also implies that the investment—capital ratio or likelihood
of investment action can be lower in diversified firms than in focused firms.
Proposition 4 also provides predictions about the amount of restricted stock.
Prediction 2: The grant size of restricted stock is independent of the extent of the
financial crisis risk or the authorization and litigation risk. The grant size of restricted
stock is larger as the manager’s task is more complicated. Furthermore, if the manager’s
and shareholders’ impatience levels are not too different, the grant size of restricted stock
is larger as the volatility of the firm’s cash flow stream is reduced. The grant size of
restricted stock is also larger as managerial impatience becomes weaker, if the volatility
of the firm’s cash flow stream is sufficiently large.
Existing empirical studies provide predictions only about the amount of stock-based
compensation. However, we can suppose that the grant size of the sum of restricted stock
and stock options is determined by a mechanism similar to that of the determination
of our α. In addition, the arguments in Sections 4.5—4.7 also suggest that firms with
debt financing, diversified firms involving in complicated business activities, and firms
with weak corporate governance may result in a combination of restricted stock and stock
options. Hence, we can relate our prediction to the following literature. First, several em-
pirical studies suggest that pay-for-performance measures become smaller as firm income
becomes more volatile. For example, Garen (1994), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), Kraft
and Niederprüm (1999), and Dee, Lulseged, and Nowlin (2005) show that executive pay
in riskier firms responds less to the firm’s stock market performance than does executive
pay in less risky firms. If the manager’s degree of impatience is not too different from that
of shareholders, these findings support the prediction regarding the volatility of the firm’s
cash flow stream. Furthermore, Jin (2002) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) extend the
above work by decomposing risk into its systematic and idiosyncratic components, and
find that idiosyncratic risk has a significant negative effect on pay sensitivities. Jin (2002)
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also indicates that incentives for CEOs likely to face binding short-selling constraints
decrease with both systematic and nonsystematic risk. If the idiosyncratic component
increases managerial short-termism, these findings are consistent with not only the pre-
diction regarding the volatility of the firm’s cash flow stream but also the prediction
regarding managerial impatience.
Second, Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) report that default risk is strongly negatively
related to the amount of CEO equity compensation. This finding is consistent with
the above prediction regarding managerial impatience. On the other hand, managerial
impatience decreases as the managerial labor market becomes deeper. If the US has a
deeper managerial labor market than elsewhere, our prediction is also consistent with the
stylized feature that stock-based compensation for US managers makes up a considerably
larger proportion of the average compensation schedule than elsewhere. Furthermore,
Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) indicate that stock-based compensation in the US increased
considerably during the period 1993—2003. This tendency coincides with the increased
occupational mobility of executives, as suggested by Murphy and Zábojník (2004). These
findings also support our predictions regarding managerial impatience.
Finally, the statement regarding financial crisis risk or authorization and litigation risk
and the statement regarding the manager’s task complexity also provide new empirical
implications. In particular, the latter statement can be rephrased so that stock-based
compensation is used more in diversified firms than in focused firms.
We now proceed to discuss the likelihood of the use of stock options instead of, or
in addition to, restricted stock. During the 2000s, average CEO compensation declined,
and restricted stock grants replaced stock options as the most common form of stock
compensation. Indeed, although stock options enjoyed favorable accounting treatment
and avoided being expensed through the firm’s income statements until 2005, they have
now lost many of these advantages, at least in the US. This is also one of the main
practical reasons why stock option grants first became popular in the 1990s and ceased
being so in the 2000s (see Frydman and Jenter (2010), Frydman and Saks (2010), and
Murphy (2013)). However, stock options have never fulfilled their intended role in CEO
compensation. Hence, we need to consider what economic forces make stock options
dominate over restricted stock, although Proposition 3 implies that restricted stock is
preferred to stock options.
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In Sections 4.5—4.7, we derived several economic forces that lead stock options to dom-
inate restricted stock. Summarizing the arguments, we obtain the following predictions.
Prediction 3: Stock options can be more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to,
restricted stock in firms with new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversi-
fied firms involving more complicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate
governance. However, the effect of the presence of outstanding debt on the likelihood of
the use of stock options is ambiguous.
In the existing theoretical literature, Dittmann and Maug (2007) suggest that stock
options are optimal relative to restricted stock if the manager is risk neutral or has only
moderate levels of risk aversion, whereas Kadan and Swinkels (2008) indicate that stock
options are optimal relative to restricted stock if the risk-averse manager does not face a
higher risk of bankruptcy. By contrast, our predictions imply that stock options may be
used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in firms with new debt financing and
impatient managers (for example, reorganized firms with new debt financing), diversified
firms involving complicated business activities (for example, financial conglomerates), and
firms with weak corporate governance.
6. Conclusion
This paper considers how managers whose objectives are not aligned with those of their
firm’s shareholders and who face the possibility of project liquidation choose the timing
of investment in risky but value-increasing projects, when the managerial compensation
schedule is designed endogenously. We examine the situation in which the trigger point
for commencing the project cannot be specified in the contract, given incomplete and im-
perfect information. Using the real options approach, we show that: (i) restricted stock
is optimal relative to stock options under various circumstances, although stock options
may be more likely to be used instead of, or in addition to, restricted stock in firms with
new debt financing and more impatient managers, diversified firms involving more com-
plicated business activities, and firms with weaker corporate governance; and (ii) project
start-up is more likely to be deterred by a higher probability of project liquidation, more
volatile firm cash flows, higher managerial effort cost, and a lower degree of managerial
impatience, whereas stock-based managerial compensation is independent of the liqui-
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dation probability, increasing in the manager’s higher effort cost, and decreasing in the
volatility of the firm’s cash flow stream and the degree of managerial impatience.
Our modeling approach suggests the importance of dynamic considerations, not only in
investment timing by managers but also in the optimal design of managerial compensa-
tion schedules. One natural extension would involve analyzing how the timing of various
organizational decisions is endogenously determined together with managerial compen-
sation schemes (for example, see Habib and Mella-Barral (2007) for the formation and
duration of joint ventures, Lambrecht and Myers (2007) for the mechanism of takeovers,
and Dangl, Wu, and Zechner (2008) for the replacement of the manager, although these
models assume fixed contract payment schedules). The hidden information consideration,
as discussed in Morellec and Schürhoff (2011), would also be an important extension.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Let V (xt) denote the value of the option to invest. Using Ito’s
lemma, V (xt) satisfies the differential equation 12σ2x2Vxx (x) + μxVx (x) − rV (x) = 0,
where Vx = dV/dx, Vxx = d2V/d2x and V (0) = 0.24 Using V (0) = 0, we can show that
the solution is determined by V (x) = AV xβ1 , where AV is a constant parameter with
AV > 0 and β1 = 12 − μσ2 +
q
( μσ2 − 12)2 + 2rσ2 (> 1).
Let F (xt) denote the value of the project, given the current level of the instantaneous
cash flow xt. Then, it follows from (1) that F (xt) = (1 − ε)E £R∞τ xse−rsds¤ = (1−ε)xτr−μ ,
where E is the expectation operator (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). This is because
F (xt) is the expected discounted value of the cash flow stream. Then, the boundary
conditions in this problem are V (xFI) =
(1−ε)xFI
r−μ − CS − CM and dV (x)dx |x=xFI = 1−εr−μ ,
where xFI is the full information commencement trigger. The first boundary condition is
the value-matching condition, which states that the shareholders’ payoff is (1−ε)xFI
r−μ − CS
− CM at the date at which the commencement option is exercised.25 The second boundary
condition is the smooth-pasting condition, which ensures that the exercise trigger is chosen
to maximize the value of the option to invest. Combining these two conditions with V (x)
= AV x
β1, we can derive (2) and (3), given in Proposition 1. k
Proof of Proposition 2: As in the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that G (x)
satisfies the differential equation 1
2
σ2x2Gxx (x) + μxGx (x) − (r + ξ)G(x) = 0, where Gx
= dG/dx, Gxx = d2G/d2x and G (0) = 0. Then, repeating a procedure similar to that in
the proof of Proposition 1, we can derive (4) and (5), given in Proposition 2. Note that
γ1 ≥ β1 > 1. k
Proof of Proposition 3: As Lemma 1 ensures that (IR) is not binding, we begin with
solving problem (6) by dropping (IR) and 0 < α ≤ 1 from the set of constraints. After
the solution under this assumption is obtained, we check whether the obtained solution
satisfies 0 < α ≤ 1.
Because (IR) is not binding and the objective function of (6) is decreasing in φ, it follows
24V (x) satisfies the following Bellman equation: V (x) = E[V (x+ dx) e−rdt]. Expanding the right-
hand side of this equation with Ito’s lemma and rearranging it as dt → 0, we obtain the differential
equation introduced here. Note that we remove subscript t from xt and set dV/dt = 0. This is because
the time horizon is infinite and neither μ nor σ depends on time explicitly. Thus, the value function does
not depend on time.
25Note that the manager needs to be compensated for the loss of CM .
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from (BS) that φ = 0. Substituting φ = 0 and x∗ from (IC) into the objective function















(1− α)(1− ε)(1− β1)
r − μ + β1
CS − α(1− ε)P
x∗
¸ γ1(r + ξ − μ)






(1− α)(1− ε)(1− β1)
r − μ + β1
CS − α(1− ε)P
x∗
¸ γ1(r + ξ − μ)






¢β1 ζ is the nonnegative multiplier associated with the constraint (EP).
Combining (A1) and (A2), we obtain












Substituting x∗ from (IC) into (A3) leads to





α + (1− ε)P
¸
r + γ1ξ − μ
(γ1 − 1) (r − μ) > 0.
Because the multiplier associated with (EP) is positive, we must have P = 0.
Now, substituting P = 0 into (A1) and rearranging it with (IC), we show
− (1− ε)x
∗
r − μ −
∙
(1− α)(1− ε)(1− β1)





α = 0. (A4)
Further rearranging (A4) with (IC) and P = 0 yields
α = β1 − 1β1
γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM
(γ1 − 1)(r − μ)CS + γ1(r + ξ − μ)CM . (A5)
Note that α, given by (A5), satisfies 0 < α < 1 because γ1 > β1 > 1.
Therefore, (φ∗,α∗, P ∗) = (0, β1−1β1 γ1(r+ξ−μ)CM(γ1−1)(r−μ)CS+γ1(r+ξ−μ)CM , 0), which is given by (8) of
this proposition. Substituting (φ∗,α∗, P ∗) into (IC), WS(x0), andWM(x0), we obtain (7),
(9), and (10) of this proposition. Note that x∗ > xFI because γ1 > 1 and ξ > 0. k
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Proof of Proposition 4: The results of ε and σ are evident. On the other hand, it
is found from ∂β1∂ξ = 0 and
∂γ1∂ξ > 0 that
∂x∗
∂ξ < 0 and
∂α∗








γ1−1 is satisfied if γ1 is sufficiently close to 1. It follows from the
definition of γ1 that γ1 is sufficiently close to 1 if σ2 is sufficiently large. Hence, we verify
that ∂x∗∂ξ < 0 and
∂α∗
∂ξ < 0 if σ2 is sufficiently large. k
Proof of Proposition 5: If φ is allowed to be negative, it must be minimized under the
set of constraints in problem (6) because the objective function of (6) is decreasing in φ.




´γ1 ∙α (1− ε)µ x∗





Substituting (A6) and (IC) into (6), deriving the first-order conditions with respect to α






´γ1¸ (1− ε)2 x∗




where ζφ is the nonnegative multiplier associated with the constraint (EP), and the in-
equalities in (A7) follow from ξ ≥ 0. Note that the inequalities of (A7) are satisfied with
equality only if ξ = 0.
(i) Suppose that γ1 > β1 (or ξ > 0). Then, ζφ > 0. This implies that P ∗ = 0. Substituting
P ∗ = 0 and x∗ from (IC) into (A6), we see that φ∗ = − ¡x0
x∗
¢γ1 CMγ1−1 < 0. Given P ∗ = 0
and (IC), it also follows from the first-order condition with respect to α that









¢β1 CS + γ1 n(r − μ) hβ1 ¡x0x∗ ¢β1 − ¡x0x∗ ¢γ1i+ β1ξ ¡x0x∗ ¢β1oCM ∈ (0, 1).
Here, α∗ ∈ (0, 1) is derived from γ1 > β1 > 1. Substituting this α∗ into (IC) and using
γ1 > β1, we obtain x∗ > 11−ε β1β1−1(r− μ)CS + 11−ε γ1γ1−1(r+ ξ − μ)CM . Thus, x∗ > xFI if ξ
is not sufficiently large.
(ii) If γ1 = β1 (or ξ = 0), it is found from the argument of (A7) that ζφ = 0. Using γ1 =
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1− ε (CS + CM) = xFI . (A8)
Combining (IC) and (A8) with γ1 = β1, we see that
α∗ = CM
CS + CM − (1− ε)P ∗ . (A9)
Hence, it follows from (A9) with 1 ≥ α and P ≥ 0 that
0 ≤ P ∗ ≤ CS
1− ε . (A10)




´β1 CM(CS + CM)
(β1 − 1) [CS + CM − (1− ε)P ∗] < 0. (A11)
Thus, the optimal contract is given by (A9)—(A11). The optimal trigger point is given by
(A8). k
Proof of Proposition 6: In firm maximization problem (11), neither (IRA) nor (IRB)
is binding, as shown in Section 3.2. This intuition is again related to the investment rule
of the standard real options model: The option is exercised at a trigger where the option
value is positive. Hence, we can set φ to zero.
Given these findings, we solve (11). Deriving the first-order conditions with respect to
α and P and rearranging them with ∂x∗j∂α = − CM(1−ε)α2 ∂x
∗
j
∂P (j = A,B), we obtain










































where η and ζσ2 are the nonnegative multipliers associated with (ICσ2) and P ≥ 0,
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respectively. It follows from (ICx∗A) that
(1− ε)x∗A
r − μA >
(1− ε)x∗A
r + ξ − μA > (1− ε)P +
CM
α . (A13)


























Substituting (A14) into (A12) and observing it with (A13), we show that ζσ2 > 0; that
is, P = 0. k
Proof of Proposition 7: Using standard arguments (see Lambrecht and Myers (2007,
2008)), it is straightforward to show that the optimal default threshold is given by (12).
The derivation of W bM(x
∗
i ) and D(x
∗
i ) is also standard (see Lambrecht and Myers (2007,
2008)). Finally, the option is exercised at a trigger where the option value is positive.
Hence, W bM(x
∗
i ) > 0. k
Proof of Proposition 8: As in the proof of Proposition 1 or 2, the value of the option
to invest, H (xt), is determined by H (x) = AHxβ1 , where AH is a constant parameter
with AH > 0. The boundary conditions in this problem are








r + ξ − μ −










where the first boundary condition is the value-matching condition and the second bound-
ary condition is the smooth-pasting condition. Combining (A15) and (A16) with H (x) =
AHx
β1, we obtain (15). The derivation of (16) and (17) is standard (see Lambrecht and
Myers (2007, 2008)), and W bM(x0) > 0 is evident from Proposition 7. k
Proof of Proposition 9: It is straightforward to see that φ = 0 and W bM(x0) > 0 in
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problem (18). Hence, we only need to solve problem (18) by dropping the variable φ and
the constraint W bM(x0) ≥ 0.26 Deriving the first-order conditions with respect to α and
P and rearranging them with ∂x
∗
i∂α = − CM(1−ε)α2 ∂x
∗
i∂P from (15), we can show that





r − μ − P −
s
r














´β1 ζb is the nonnegative multiplier associated with P ≥ 0. As long as the
investment option is exercised, it follows from (15) with γ1 > 1 and γ2 < 0 that the
right-hand side of (A17) is positive if ξ (≥ 0) is sufficiently small. Hence, we must have
P = 0. k
Proof of Proposition 10: Solving problem (20) with the arguments of Proposition 3,
we can obtain
























−(1− εn)(1− α)(βn − 1)
∙
x∗n










where ζmn is the nonnegative multiplier associated with P ≥ 0. Note that (A18) can be
derived using the relation ∂x
∗





from (ICn). Now, if CMn is sufficiently
small relative to CSn, the last term in the large bracket of (A18) is sufficiently close to
zero. Hence, it follows from (ICm) and (ICn) that ζmn > 0. Thus, we must have P = 0. k
26Again, we can drop 1 ≥ α > 0.
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